Visiting the Tjong A Fie's Mansion, Medan (棉蘭 張亞輝古居)

從臉書創辦人開始學中文談起

* 2010-10-22
* 工商時報
* 【本報訊】

　「我認為中國的價值觀遠不同於美國，因此在跨入該國前，我要花大量時間研究中國，好好想清楚在這個市場該怎麼做。」說這段話的人，是現年26歲的臉書（Facebook）創辦人查克柏格（Mark Zuckerberg）。為求臉書有朝一日在中國成為有頭有臉的熱門網站，他現在每天花1小時學中文。這位80後創業家的一小步，極可能預示著全球將邁出「中文熱」的更一大步。

　中國很難懂嗎？這個號稱有五千年歷史，又在二戰後拉下「鐵幕」鎖國數十年的東方國家，對以美國為中心的西方民主世界而言，確實很難懂。無論是宗教信仰、言論自由、基本人權、政商關係、經濟規劃、民族主義，乃至國際外交，都自有一套具中國特色的遊戲規則。

　最新的例子是，中國人民銀行於19日閃電升息一碼，跌破絕大多數外國分析師的眼鏡，少數預測準確的專家則皆出身中國，包括陶冬與謝國忠。如果以後見之明分析，人行選擇在十七屆五中全會閉幕隔日升息，短期著眼於打擊投機、房市與通膨，兼而回應美國的人民幣升值呼聲，長期則意在為「十二五規劃」的加快轉變經濟發展方式鋪路，似乎也不令人意外，但是西方專家事前就是沒人猜到北京當局出招的時間點。

　近期急催人民幣升值的美國歐巴馬政府，自然無法理解中國堅稱提高匯率彈性是「有利於維護戰略機遇期」的文字玄機。對照當年柯林頓總統任內順利逼迫日圓升值近3成，現任財長蓋特納應該也不懂，為何中國就是不肯像日本那樣乖乖就範？但如果他未來有機會釐清，「和」這個被《中華遺產》雜誌票選為最中國的漢字，除了政治語言的「和諧社會」、傳統的「以和為貴」外，還有謀略的「以戰逼和」，那或許就能掌握「戰略機遇期」的箇中真義。

　面對中國崛起，曾經歷冷戰階段的西方人多半存有疑慮，極端者更將其妖魔化，認定中國的壯大必然是全球的災難。因此，像克魯曼這類美國優先的經濟學家會痛斥中國管制稀土出口是流氓經濟，卻避談美國礦業政策的失誤。不管是身為既有強權的美國政府，還是自認正義化身的克魯曼，他們都選擇了與中國硬式交鋒。儘管華府是硬中帶軟，還願意延後匯率報告的發布時機，為彼此留下轉圜餘地，而不必負行政責任的克魯曼則是一味謾罵。

　然而80後的查克柏格卻選擇與中國軟性邂逅。生於1984年的他，冷戰結束時還沒上小學，因此沒有上一輩「反共抗俄」的沉重包袱。他與當前眾多80、90後的年輕人一樣，都是數位原生，懂事後就生活在電腦網路的「國度」裡，從這個角度來看，與其說他是美國人，不如說他是全球人，而他創辦的臉書正是企圖串連網路的「大同世界」，且已吸引5億用戶，相當於全球69億總人口的7％。

　這樣的查克柏格，會說出「隱私權時代已經結束」的犯眾怒宣言；這樣的查克柏格，會被當紅賣座電影《社群網戰》影射為求愛不成而發憤創辦臉書的毛頭小子；但這樣的查克柏格，卻也勇於突破民族國家的藩離，表達尊重多元文化，而非一逕要將西方價值觀加諸非我族類。更重要的是，查克柏格這輩跳 tone、kuso的年輕人，在戰後嬰兒潮陸續退休後，終將成為社會的中堅。

　有人或許會質疑，查克柏格是個商人，商人無祖國，學中文無非是想在中國做生意，不應對其動機陳義過高。的確，之前美國投資大師羅傑斯由於看好中國前景，不僅搬到亞洲就近觀察，還讓學齡前的愛女學中文，也是著眼於商業利益。但「知己知彼，百戰不殆」本是孫子兵法傳世的明訓，查克柏格與羅傑斯為了「知彼」而學習中文，從入境問俗、隨俗開始，已踏出成功的第一步，未來如果有更多人起而效尤，在攫取商機的本意之外，達到消弭東西文化歧異的功能，甚或發揮「入境改俗」的作用，未嘗不值得期待。

　擺在眼前的事實是，不管你是喜歡中華文化的博大精深，還是討厭中共政權的蠻橫無理，只要想在這個超大的新興市場分一杯羹，就像查克柏格所說，必須了解中國的語言、文化和思想，如果不「知中」，還談什麼連結全世界。

　而語言做為一種溝通工具，對多數人而言，本就是實際需求創造學習動機，因此台灣的科技富豪以往不必是名校外文系出身，也會強逼自己鍛鍊出討價還價的外語能力。以此來看，教育體系裡的語言資源分配，或許更該跳脫意識型態的框架，面對「中文熱」大勢所趨，重新權衡中、英文與母語的比例配置。台灣若坐擁「中華文化正統」寶山而不知善加發揮，反而只望著「英語」那山高，這種自廢武功的語言政策，只會令人徒呼負負！

China's 60th Birthday: The Road to Prosperity

Sixty years ago Mao Zedong stood before a sea of people atop Tiananmen Gate proclaiming, in his high-pitched Hunan dialect, the founding of the People's Republic of China and that the "Chinese people have stood up!" The moment was marked with pride and hope. The communists' victory had vanquished the Nationalist regime, withstood the vicious onslaught of the Japanese invasion and overturned the century of foreign encroachment on China's territory. Moreover, Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power without significant external support — theirs was largely a homegrown revolution.

Mao brought a vision for China that has resonated from the 19th century Qing dynasty reformers to this day: to regain China's fu qiang (wealth and power), dignity, international respect and territorial integrity. In this regard, Mao and the CCP positioned themselves squarely with a deep yearning among Chinese — thus earning their loyalty and the party's legitimacy. His successors have not wavered from this singular vision and mission.

Tragically, Mao's belief in restoring China's greatness and achieving modernity was inextricably intertwined with his ideological desire to transform China into a socialist and revolutionary society. Mao's social engineering continually convulsed China in unrelenting political campaigns. These movements disrupted productivity and caused horrific loss of life. Yet, despite the chaos, the People's Republic embarked on industrialization and stood up. By many measures, 60 years on, China has achieved significant progress toward becoming a major and global power. Mao may recognize it, but he would not be wholly happy with it.

As the People's Republic of China commemorates its 60th anniversary, it seemingly has much to celebrate. China is the world's most populous and industrious nation, is the world's third largest economy and trading nation, has become a global innovator in science and technology, and is building a world-class university system. It has an increasingly modern military and commands diplomatic respect. It is at peace with its neighbors and all major powers. Its hybrid model of quasi-state capitalism and semidemocratic authoritarianism — sometimes dubbed the "Beijing Consensus" — has attracted attention across the developing world.

This growing soft power of China was strengthened by the 2008 Olympics extravaganza, and the Shanghai Expo next year will similarly dazzle. The 60th anniversary celebration in Beijing on Oct. 1 will impress, if not frighten, the world with an arresting display of military hardware and goose-stepping soldiers. Less visible is the fact that China is the first major economy to recover from the global recession and, indeed, is leading the world out of it.

China is on a roll, particularly when viewed over time. Visiting or living in China every year over the past three decades, I have had the personal opportunity to witness dramatic transformations. When I first went to China in 1979, vestiges of the Cultural Revolution were still evident: revolutionary slogans painted on walls and pockmarks on university buildings from bullets and howitzer shells shot by dueling Red Guards. Camouflaged, but just as evident, were the personal scars borne by intellectuals and officials whom I met at the time. I heard stories of beatings and humiliations, confiscations of personal possessions and loss of living quarters, and forced hard labor.

I then witnessed the dramatic blossoming of personal freedoms and economic growth in the 1980s, punctuated by periodic countercampaigns launched by neo-Maoists in the leadership. One could literally feel and see Chinese society come alive after its long Maoist trauma, only to have people quickly recoil when the conservatives in the leadership reasserted themselves. This seesaw pattern persisted throughout the decade, culminating in the dramatic Tiananmen demonstrations and their suppression in June 1989.

In the early 1990s, I again experienced China as a society traumatized, this time by the aftermath of Tiananmen. But by mid-decade Deng Xiaoping had reignited domestic economic reforms and China had normalized its place in the world after its post-Tiananmen isolation. Politics, however, remained frozen and the heavy hand of the state remained evident. Only during the present decade, in the waning years of Jiang Zemin's rule and under Hu Jintao, has the Communist Party begun to experiment with very limited political reforms. My discussions with those party officials involved with crafting the "democratic" reforms makes clear that there are strict boundaries to how far they will proceed.

Thus, when considering the totality of six decades, the record of the PRC is decidedly mixed. While its achievements have been momentous, so are the contrasts and contradictions exposed by those very same achievements. In many sectors, each reform breeds new problems and challenges. China has come a long way, but it still has a long way to go.

The question for China's leaders was never whether to modernize — but how. During the Maoist era a variety of economic models were experimented with, each of which achieving some modicum of growth. Yet all of them left China lagging far behind the West and East Asia. The costs of some initiatives, like the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1960, were catastrophic in human and environmental terms. It was not until Deng and Chen Yun, another reform-minded Politburo member, returned to power in 1978 from internal exile that the economic course was changed.

Three decades later, the world witnesses the extraordinary results. China is now the world's third largest economy, after the U.S. and Japan, and recently surpassed Germany as the largest exporting nation. Its GNP is on course to overtake Japan's by 2010 and perhaps that of the U.S. by 2020.

Much of this dynamic growth has been export-driven, benefiting the low- and medium-technology sectors of the economy. But China is beginning to move up the technological ladder and is becoming more innovative in certain sectors such as electronics and biotechnology. The country has become a manufacturing superpower and the workshop of the world, producing two-thirds of all photocopiers, microwaves and shoes; 60% of cell phones; 55% of DVDs; over half of all digital cameras; 30% of personal computers; and 75% of children's toys, plus a wide variety of other goods.

As a result of its economic boom, China has amassed a staggering $2 trillion in foreign exchange — the largest reserves in the world — and is beginning to invest significant amounts abroad. Today, 37 Chinese multinational corporations rank among FORTUNE's top 500 global companies, up from just six a decade ago, while 450 out of the FORTUNE 500 American companies have production lines and a business presence in China. China has become the world's largest recipient of foreign direct investment. To fuel its economic boom, China's voracious and insatiable appetite for raw materials has led it to absorb large amounts of global commodities. China now consumes 16% of global energy resources and is the world's third largest consumer of oil.

But the economic explosion has come at a high environmental cost. China's air and water are among the most polluted on earth and it is the leading emitter of greenhouse gases. The environmental nightmare is hurting public health. Malignant cancer now accounts for 28.5% of deaths while respiratory diseases account for 13.1%, according to the 2008 China Statistical Yearbook. China's growth has been dynamic, but it is also double-edged.

Reinventing a Nation

Mao spent his lifetime trying to transform Chinese society in his utopian, socialist and revolutionary vision. He tried to create a "new socialist man" and an equitable society. His regime succeeded in providing the world's largest population with food to eat, housing and basic services. Social vices were eliminated, literacy was expanded, life expectancy increased and infant mortality decreased. These were no small achievements. But Mao's efforts to impose socialism had a deadening effect on urban and rural society alike, as political movements repeatedly harassed different groups of people.

By the time Deng and his compatriots came to power in 1978, China was traumatized, tired and alienated by 30 years of Maoist experiments and totalitarian controls. Deng's wisdom was to recognize that the state needed to retreat from society and the economy if the creative and entrepreneurial spirits of ordinary Chinese were to be unleashed.

Three decades later, Chinese society has fully blossomed. Chinese today experience a wide variety of personal freedoms in daily life that they and their ancestors had never known. Chinese state and society have also reconnected with the past, emphasizing Confucian and Buddhist values. More than 200 million people have been lifted out of poverty and the members of a growing middle class with disposable income travel abroad, invest in the stock market, dine out and decorate their stylish apartments with furniture purchased from stores like Ikea. Access to education has become far more widespread. Some 21 million students attend university today, while an estimated 300,000 study abroad every year. Approximately 206 million Chinese children attend primary and secondary schools. Basic literacy is almost universal in China today, while it was roughly 20% in 1949. Still, China remains a poor country by global standards: some 207 million people still live below World Bank poverty levels on less than $1.25 per day.

With economic growth have come demographic shifts and life improvements. Live expectancy has shot up while infant mortality has plummeted. In 1949 more than 90% of the population lived in rural areas; given the expansion of urban areas, slightly more than half (721 million) do today, according to official statistics. But China's increasing urbanization and spreading industrialization have resulted in a considerable loss of arable land and forcible evictions, sparking much resentment against local officials.

Chinese intellectual life has also improved, although over time this remains one of the real dark spots of Chinese communist rule. For six decades intellectuals have been persecuted, harassed and forced to conform and create within various boundaries set by the state. They continually probe the boundaries — until the state pushes back. Despite continuing controls, public and private discourse in China has never been so free. The blogosphere and Internet are alive with unbridled discussion — unless and until it crosses the state censor's invisible hand.

While China has made much progress, it still has many blemishes. Treatment of ethnic minorities — particularly Tibetans and Uighurs — is the Achilles' heel of the regime, as violent riots last year and in recent months have clearly demonstrated. Crime and corruption remain serious problems, while cities struggle to provide basic services to the huge "floating population" of 100 million or so migrants. Income disparities (as measured by the Gini coefficient) are now approaching the highest in the world. China has again become a stratified society — just what Mao sought to eliminate. Still, given the unprecedented scale and nature of China's socioeconomic change over the past 30 years, the country's relative stability is commendable.

Politics Not as Usual

At first glance, China's political system has not changed much since 1949. It is still a Leninist system, dominated by the CCP and an oligarchy of its self-selected leaders, which tolerates no opposition. The Party's powerful Organization Department oversees all major appointments in the country, and one must really be a party member to get ahead professionally. Party and government organs remain essentially as they were six decades ago, copied from the Soviet Union.

But while much of the structure and essential nature of the system remains largely the same, the substance and process of politics has changed quite a lot. The leadership and the 76 million party members are better educated and their recruitment and promotion is much more meritocratic. Competence is now rewarded. In the past, there existed only two exit paths from officialdom: purges and death. Now mandatory retirement is firmly implemented. Instead of being a totalitarian party dominated by a single leader, the CCP today is an authoritarian party with a collective leadership. The leaders themselves — at least those I have witnessed — are now remarkably self-assured and relatively sophisticated. Marxist-Leninist ideology plays little, if any, role in their decision-making. The policy process is more consultative, although still lacking in transparency. Much emphasis is put on governance and officials at all levels undergo required training in public administration.

On the whole, the Communist Party has proven itself to be remarkably adaptable and open to borrowing elements from different countries and political systems. As a result it is becoming a hybrid party with elements of East Asian neo-authoritarianism, Latin American corporatism and European social democracy all grafted to Confucianist-Leninist roots. The uprising in Tiananmen and across China in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of communist systems in Europe and the Soviet Union were instructive experiences for the CCP. Many lessons were drawn, but the principal one was to remain flexible and adaptable, not dogmatic and rigid.

Will the Party's adaptability and the nation's continuing economic growth be sufficient to sustain it in power indefinitely? Perhaps. The CCP's sustenance to date has certainly surprised many leading China watchers. But, going forward, the major challenge to the Party will likely be its ability to deliver adequate "public goods" to the population: health care, education, environmental protection and other social services. Providing stability and ever increasing personal wealth will not be enough to guarantee the Party indefinite legitimacy — it must continuously improve the quality of life of its citizens. This is China's new revolution: the revolution of rising expectations.

Taking On the World

Any consideration of China's transformation since 1949 must recognize the dramatic improvement in China's global posture. Sixty years ago the new People's Republic was cut off from the world, having diplomatic recognition only from a relatively small number of nations. It was excluded from the U.N. It soon became embroiled in the Korean War and the Cold War, which brought further isolation. Despite some marginal trade with Western Europe following the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, China was cut off from international trade, finance and aid. As a result, its economy stagnated.

Six decades later, China has fully embraced globalization at home and has burst onto the world's stage in a largely positive fashion. It now has both interests and a presence in parts of the world completely new to China — such as Latin America and the Middle East — and enjoys rising international prestige. Beijing has generally managed its relations well with the major world powers: the U.S., Russia and the E.U. It has transformed its regional diplomacy in Asia, reasserted a role in Africa and become much more deeply engaged with international organizations and across a range of global-governance issues. China used to eschew multilateralism, distrusting it as some kind of (Western) conspiracy. While Beijing remains a selective multilateralist globally — engaging on some issues and not others — the broad trend has been positive and in the direction of deeper contributions to the world community.

China is also more proactive on global security issues ("hot spots" as Chinese analysts like to describe them). When natural disasters now strike, such as the South and Southeast Asian tsunami in 2004 and the Pakistan earthquake the following year, China is there to provide physical and financial assistance. China now has over 2,100 peacekeeping personnel deployed in about a dozen nations worldwide — more than any other member of the U.N. Security Council. This is one tangible expression of China's strong commitment to the U.N. Today, indeed, the PRC may be the greatest advocate of the U.N. among the major powers.

In the field of arms control, China used to be a serious proliferator of missiles and missile components, and a significant seller of conventional arms. But, over time, China has signed or ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Biological and Conventional Weapons Convention, has joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and has essentially adhered to the Missile Technology Control Regime (although it is not a member). This is not the China that the world used to know: a "revisionist" destabilizing power that sought to overturn the international order. Today, the People's Republic of China is deeply involved across the globe and is increasingly an upholder of, and contributor to, the existing international order. China has been a considerable beneficiary of the post – Cold War order, which has allowed Beijing to establish a presence in regions and international institutions that was not previously possible.

China's strategic posture is also changing. Its military modernization program has made giant strides in recent years — and they will be on display in the massive military parade in central Beijing on Oct. 1. In many categories China's military is the best in Asia and in some sectors is approaching NATO standards. The People's Liberation Army still has no global strike capacity, however, other than its intercontinental ballistic missiles and cyberwarfare capabilities.

Still, many countries worry about China's rise and global expansion, even though it has, to date, been outwardly peaceful. Public opinion polls in Europe and the U.S. regularly reflect a negative image of China, while concerns over economic competition and job losses are growing in Europe, Africa and Latin America. Substantial strains remain in Beijing's ties with three of China's most important neighbors: Australia, India and Japan. Even relations with Russia, which have achieved historic highs since the collapse of the Soviet Union, have run into obstacles. This is unsurprising. As Beijing expands its influence and begins to flex its new muscle on the world stage, it's to be expected that China will engender occasional discord with other nations.

Future Shock?

Some historians of China think they see the telltale signs of dynastic decline: government corruption, social discontent (especially in the countryside), autocratic rulers and a militarizing state. Some contemporary China experts also voice their doubts — proclaiming the regime fragile and the political system ossified — while economists question how long the dynamic growth can continue.

While the system and country have weaknesses and challenges, the Sinological landscape is littered with its naysayers and critics. The People's Republic of China has endured for six decades and has overcome a wide variety of serious domestic crises, border wars and international isolation. Its strengths and adaptability have repeatedly been underestimated by outside observers. One thing is certain: China will remain a country of complexity and contradictions — which will keep China watchers and Chinese alike guessing about its future indefinitely.

Shambaugh is professor and director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and currently a visiting scholar at the China Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. His latest book is China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation

China at 60: The Road to Prosperity

China at 60: The Road to Prosperity

明星一甲子 台湾文化财

• 2009-09-27
• 旺报
• 【（单永立／台北市．文字工作者）】

　被台湾艺文界人士视为著名人文历史地标，曾孕育白先勇、林怀民、黄春明、陈映真等多位当代知名文艺工作者创作灵感的台北市明星咖啡馆，今年开业届满一甲子。明星咖啡馆曾歇业十多年，还曾遭祝融光顾，五年前重新开张。

　武昌街上演时代传奇

　咖啡馆经营者简锦锥先生的传记《武昌街一段七号》，详述年少离家到上海打拼，经历日本据台末期的艰苦岁月与二二八事件的混乱。

　简因缘际会结识落魄俄国贵族Elsner，Elsner曾为帝俄禁卫军团长，目睹被末代沙皇全家遗骸遭盐酸毁损惨状，两人成为莫逆之交，与白俄难民合资开设西点面包店与咖啡馆，成为巧克力蛋糕风行台湾的开山祖师。

　简锦锥因此学会俄语， 成了当时反共抗俄氛围下，极少数能与蒋方良女士以俄语沟通的台湾人 。身为戒严体制下统治阶层的蒋经国夫妇，与具有冲撞体制性格的艺文创作者，竟曾不约而同地在明星咖啡馆交集。

　旧俄贵族竟埋骨台湾

　为了不让孑然一身的Elsner，因白俄股东间纠纷，沦为无国籍人球被驱逐出境，简出面顶下经营权，把罹患中风的Elsner，与另一对也是股东的白俄夫妇，当成自家长辈照顾送终。明星咖啡馆的起伏与简锦锥生平，乃至埋骨台湾的旧俄王孙际遇，正是一部具体而微，串连俄罗斯、中国与台湾的近代史缩影。简先生在二二八时收容饥寒交迫的外省人，伸出援手帮助摆摊的诗人周梦蝶，收容年迈的白俄难民，体现了人性的光明面。

　掌握文化历史诠释权

　台北市是典型移民都会，呈现华、洋、和杂揉并陈的多元面貌，这是台湾社会应珍惜的历史文化遗产。简先生的际遇与明星咖啡馆的沧桑，反映台湾从威权封闭到民主多元的社会文化变迁，既台湾又很中国，还富国际色彩，实为上乘创作素材。

　主管媒体、观光与文化事务的相关单位，何不尝试寻找适当合作对象，将这段尘封的历史，拍摄成电影戏剧，不仅为历史作见证，更可把明星咖啡馆与台北市推向国际。

　两年前日本媒体抢先把邓丽君生平改编成电视单元剧《台湾歌姬邓丽君》，大赚台湾与东南亚国家的钱，曾引发舆论的检讨反省。好莱坞近年来大肆发掘他国历史故事，当成电影创作文本素材，难道要等明星咖啡馆故事被外国制片商相中，拍成电影营销全球，台湾公众与媒体、艺文界，才又后知后觉、搥胸顿足？

　能掌握历史与文化事件的诠释与营销权才是强者，才配谈自我认同与主体性。我们的历史应该立足于自身社会价值观上，发挥创意与想象力的诠释，为其添上血肉，展现主体性。

　若台湾只是在提供创作素材，被动地消费经过全球文化霸权加工演绎阐释过的高附加价值产出，那么台湾在这种不平等的消费供需关系里面扮演的角色，只不过是文化殖民地而已！

In China, 'truthiness' trumps truth

Twenty years after Tiananmen, I found that even many of my Chinese journalism students didn't even know a pro-democracy movement existed.

By Anne Donohue

from the May 12, 2009

Boston - I'll admit it, I was naive. Twenty years after the Chinese government brutally put down a student democracy movement in Tiananmen Square, I thought some vestige of that movement might still be found in China. But after spending six months in Beijing teaching journalism students at Renmin University, where several of the 1989 pro-democracy activists were once students, I found very few young people interested in carrying the torch of Lady Liberty.

The students who transfixed the world 20 years ago are largely forgotten. Their message of democracy, the right to vote, and freedom of the press has been buried by the economic juggernaut of modern China.

Most of my students knew, at least cryptically, what happened in Tiananmen Square right around the year most of them were born. But a handful of students remained blissfully ignorant. When I asked them if they knew how many students were killed in 1989, one young girl from northeastern China answered, "None. Why would the government kill innocent students. This can't be true," she assured me.

The worldly-wise students had seen videos of the Tiananmen massacre online. They knew exactly what the government had done, and they accepted it as a necessary step in moving the country forward.

Rather than feeling horror about the crackdown, as most Westerners do, they were more troubled by the chaos and social upheaval those 1989 students might have unleashed had they been successful. Stability and economic security reign supreme; other civil liberties might be nice someday far into the future.

My students were largely a product of the "new China." They have only seen sustained progress in the form of economic prosperity unimaginable to their parents and grandparents, and for that we should all be grateful.

No one wants to turn back the clock to the darker days of war, revolution, famine, and fanaticism. But my fear for this new generation is that they have become complacent, or worse. It is too simplistic to conclude that they have been bought off: You can have your Gucci bag, but don't ask for justice.

More disconcerting is the lack of critical thinking, and at times, blind faith that China is on a roll, so don't rock the boat. Chinese pride and boosterism veer dangerously close to nationalism. Healthy criticism is seen as unpatriotic.

In a weird role reversal, the young students were the ones reminding me, the older teacher, to be patient. Repeatedly, they told me that China is a developing country, and that economic development might one day lead to some of the reforms I was encouraging. But when I reminded them that many developing countries – India, for example – have democracy and economic development, they were unconvinced.

One student boasted that China was going to build a high-speed rail system between Shanghai and Beijing, dislocating millions of Chinese in its path. In India, he lamented, this couldn't get done, because the people would stop it. To him, and many young Chinese, democracy is too slow and too messy.

One student argued that China has too many peasants who are illiterate and couldn't understand how to vote. Democracy could not work here, they insisted. I wonder what our forefathers were thinking when they entrusted the whole American enterprise to a bunch of illiterate farmers.

And for press freedom, these journalism students like the guiding hand of the government shaping the message that feeds the 1.3 billion Chinese.

I left China discouraged. I wanted for my Chinese students what my American students take for granted: a chance to speak freely, to vote, to work in the field of journalism unfettered by the government. But when I asked my students, if in an ideal world, would they want the government to get out of their lives, the unanimous response was no. They liked what the government was telling them.

Still, maybe my Chinese students were right and, in time, globalization, freedom to travel, and economic prosperity will lead to more civil liberties.

In my lighter moments I thought of Stephen Colbert, and how effective "truthiness" has been in China: You get some version of the facts, just not any that might be controversial. In my darker moments I ranted like Jack Nicholson in the film "A Few Good Men," privately screaming, "You can't handle the truth." Mostly, I just felt sympathy and admiration for these genuine, bright, and well-intentioned kids growing up in a country that they want to be proud of, even if their country wants to keep them in the dark.

As one American diplomat repeatedly reminded me, they don't know what they don't know.

Anne Donohue is a journalism professor at Boston University.

台獨 藏獨 疆獨

• 2009-07-17
• 中國時報
• 【傅建中】

　最近新疆發生暴動，中共官方宣布的死亡人數高達一百八十四人，竟比二十年前「天安門事件」罹難的人數還多（指官方公布的數字） ，事態之嚴重，可以想見。

　維吾爾族人因語言、文化和宗教與漢人迥異，加上就業和受教育的機會受到歧視性的限制，近年要求獨立的呼聲日益高漲、暴力行動亦屢有所聞，「九一一事件」後，美國曾捕獲在蓋達基地組織受訓的疆獨分子，因中共當局的要求，「東土耳其斯坦」等主張新疆獨立的成員已被美國列為恐怖分子。影響所及，美國監禁在古巴關塔那摩集中營的維吾爾人雖被釋放，竟無國家願意收容；而這些人又不願被遣返中國，最後美國不得不賄賂一些小國如阿爾巴尼亞和帛琉等予以收容。但由於語言及文化差異太大，維吾爾人在前述國家遭遇空前的適應難題。美國輿論雖同情維吾爾人，但礙於法令的規定，亦愛莫能助。

　新疆地處邊陲，與前蘇聯接壤，故蘇聯一向視新疆為其勢力範圍，尤其是一九三三到一九四四盛世才主政的近十二年期間，新疆形同蘇聯的附庸國，而盛世才一度還是蘇共黨員，甚至有意使新疆加盟蘇維埃社會主義聯邦共和國，若非史達林顧忌和蔣介石政府的戰時盟誼關係，恐怕新疆早已淪亡了。

　由於盛世才一切聽命於史達林，大批中共軍政幹部亦得以進入新疆並發展其勢力。毛澤東的弟弟毛澤民（化名周彬）就曾擔任新疆財政廳長，後遭盛殺害。已故新聞界大老歐陽醇先生在新疆工作過一年，亦曾遭盛迫害，幸能死裡逃生，他生前每憶起這段在戈壁大漠的險遇，即會放聲高歌，其悲涼雄渾的歌聲，至今仍縈繞耳際。

　盛世才雖是殺人不眨眼的魔王，卻很在意他身後的名譽，曾與美國著名中國專家懷汀（Allen S. Whiting）合寫《新疆：卒子抑樞紐?》（Sinkiang:Pawn or Pivot? 一九五八年出版）。從幅員、資源及地理位置來看，新疆自然是pivot，可是從列強以前對新疆的覬覦以及今天中共嚴密的控制，新疆始終沒能擺脫pawn的命運，眼前新疆的動亂，更加凸顯了它作為過河卒子的悲哀。

　相形之下，西藏的宿命要比新疆好多了。儘管過去半世紀來，西藏也在中共的高壓統治下，可是世人對西藏的同情及聲援，新疆是沒法比的。有世界屋脊和香格里拉之稱的西藏，對世人有種神秘的吸引力，喇嘛教亦是如此，而西藏政教領袖及諾貝爾和平獎得主達賴喇嘛更是愛、和平與非暴力的象徵，獲得舉世的尊敬，新疆則沒有一位能和達賴喇嘛媲美的領袖人物。

　美國一直視西藏為獨立於中國之外的國家，故美國國會立法明指西藏是被佔領的國家（occupied country），國務院設有專門處理西藏事務的官員和辦公室，美國之音和自由亞洲電台有藏語節目，民間有一全天候替西藏遊說和募款的組織 Campaign for Tibet（聲援西藏），著名影星李察吉爾 （Richard Gere）是達賴的死忠崇拜者，這些都是新疆所沒有的。當然中共在新疆的核子設施和美國在新疆的情報監聽站，以及新疆豐富的石油儲藏量，使美國對新疆內部的動盪無法漠視。

　在藏獨、疆獨外，還有台獨，比較起來，台獨的處境最好，他們不必受中共直接的迫害，而且不必像藏獨、疆獨長年流亡海外，無家可歸。台獨可隨時回到台灣，享受台灣人民所有的權利。

　仔細分析，台獨最沒有資格要求獨立，除了政治上對中共政權的恐懼與厭惡之外。無論種族、語言、文化和宗教，台獨都無法和中國完全切割，所以史學家余英時多年前和我談起中國邊疆民族的獨立問題時，曾表示西藏確實有獨立於中國之外的條件。至於台灣獨立，這位胡適之後的自由主義大師雖沒反對，也沒贊成，只是覺得台灣缺少西藏、新疆可以獨立的要件，譬如種族、文化和宗教的因素等。

　其實，西藏人和維吾爾人也並非真要脫離中國，達賴不是一再說過西藏只要能真正自治就行了，像北京目前行之於香港、澳門的「一國兩制」。維族人要的也是高度自治，可是中共不給，理由是西藏和新疆已經「解放」了，所以不能享有「一國兩制」，不知這是什麼邏輯？

　事實上，台灣半個多世紀來實際上是獨立的，即國際法上的 de facto independence，所差的是 de jure independence（法理上的獨立）而已。

　美國現行政策主張維持台海現狀，不得片面改變現狀，等於支持台灣實質上的獨立，所缺的只是名稱與形式罷了。早年台灣人不能當家做主，渴望獨立，情有可原，如今已經有過三位民選的台灣總統，若還高喊獨立，豈非冒「把信封擠破」（pushing the envelope）的危險？